

Research Note 3/2011

The social effects of employment developments across the EU in the crisis

November 2011





Social Situation Observatory – Income distribution and living conditions
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This Research note was financed by and prepared for the use of the European Commission, Directorate- General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication.



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1. Introduction

The financial and economic crisis which struck the EU in 2008 was associated with a sharp downturn in GDP in all countries. The effect on labour markets, however, varied markedly even in countries experiencing much the same decline in output – Germany and Spain being extreme examples, employment being largely maintained in the former whereas large-scale job losses occurred in the latter. This variation can be explained by a number of reasons, including the policy measures taken – or not taken – to maintain jobs and the differing expectations of employers about the likely duration of the recession and the prospects for recovery afterwards. Whatever the underlying reasons, the differences in the repercussions on employment of the recession, in combination with the considerable variation in the level of social support provided to those losing their jobs or working shorter hours, mean that the social effects of the recession are likely to have varied equally widely across countries. Whether they did or did not in reality, however, remains unclear at present since the income data necessary to investigate the social effects in different parts of the EU in detail are not yet available for the period concerned.

The lack of direct data means that much effort has gone into trying to estimate the social effects of the crisis. This has taken the form mainly of focusing on what has happened to unemployment and the people who have been affected, largely in terms of their age and whether they are men or women. There are, however, other aspects which are potentially important so far as the social effects are concerned, in particular, the kinds of job which have been lost and the household circumstances of the people in question. The social implications of labour market developments, therefore, tend to differ according to whether the jobs lost were full-time or part-time, whether they were highly paid or low paid, whether the people concerned lived alone or had a family, whether they were the sole wage-earner or other people in the household were working, whether those people held on to their jobs during the recession or not, and so on.

These aspects, especially those relating to the household characteristics of the people losing their jobs, tend to be neglected when considering the social effects of the recession, but they can markedly affect the consequences for income and its distribution across society¹. They are examined below. Developments in the aspects concerned during the earlier period of sustained growth and net job creation which preceded the recession are also examined to give some perspective on subsequent events.

The questions considered are, therefore:

- What kinds of job were created during the growth years?
- Did these jobs go to households where there was already someone in work or to those where there was not?

¹ For an exception, see Stephen Jenkins, Andrea Brandolini, John Micklewright and Brian Nolan. *The great recession and the distribution of household income*, which contains a number of attempts to examine this aspect using various approaches, though not the one adopted here



- What kinds of job were lost during the recession?
- What were the household circumstances of the people concerned?
- What was the likely impact on household income and on the relative numbers at risk of poverty?

The focus is very much on those aged 25-64 who account for almost 90% of employment in the EU and whose income is most affected by earnings from employment. As indicated below, young people under 25 have been disproportionately affected by the labour market situation since the onset of the recession in 2008 and their employment has declined greatly in most countries. In many cases, however, they are supported by their parents and still live in the family home. (Around 83% of young people aged 16-24 on average lived with their parents in 2009 across the EU as a whole – some 80% in the EU15 and almost 90% in the EU12 – see Figure A.1 in the Annex.) Loss of earnings, therefore, though of course not for all, tends to have less of effect on their income as conventionally measured, since if they live with their parents, they are assumed to share in the income of the household. Older people aged 65 and over are also excluded from detailed analysis since the overwhelming majority of them are no longer in employment and most of their income comes from pensions. On the other hand, children are implicitly covered since the great majority of them have parents aged 25-64 and, accordingly, their income too is affected if people of this age are no longer in work.

2. Job gains and losses before and after 2008

2.1 The growth years – increasing employment of women and part-time workers

The total number employed grew by over 1% a year in the EU as a whole in the 4 years 2003-2007. Nearly all of this growth was concentrated among those aged 25-64, who in 2003 accounted for almost 88% of the total employed but for some 95% (4.5% out of 4.8%) of the overall increase in employment which occurred over the period. There was a small increase among those aged under 25, but their share of total employment fell over this period, and a larger increase among those of 65 or over, whose share rose slightly over the four years (Table 1, which shows first, the share in employment of the groups distinguished and, secondly, their contribution to the overall increase in employment and not the percentage change as such)².

Within the 25-64 age group, women accounted for most of the additional numbers in employment (around 60%), though the majority of women taking up jobs (56%) worked part-time, pushing up the share of women in such jobs (to just over 30% of the total in work). This suggests that there is likely to have been a corresponding increase in the number of two-earner households, but in many cases, the second earner concerned had a part-time rather than a full-time job. There was also a disproportionate increase in part-time working among men, a quarter of all the net additional jobs for men being part-time.

²It should be noted that total employment is based on national accounts data, which represent the best measure of changes in employment over time, while the division between men and women, age groups and full-time and part-time comes from Labour Force Survey data, which have been aligned with the national accounts figures.

**But more men employed and reduced part-time working in the EU12**

The experience over this period, however, was very different in the EU12 countries (i.e. the Central and Eastern European countries that have entered the EU since 2004), where overall growth was slightly higher, than in the EU15 Member States. In particular, while virtually all of the employment growth was among those aged 25-64 in both, men rather than women accounted for most of job growth (over 60%) in the EU12, whereas in the EU15, the increase in the number of women employed was twice as large as among men. Moreover, in the EU15, most of the net additional jobs taken up by women were part-time (almost 70%) and – perhaps surprisingly – almost half of those taken up by men (46%). In the EU12, by contrast, all of the net additional jobs going to both men and women were full-time. Although there are differences between countries, the broad tendencies apparent at the aggregate level for the two groups are also evident in most Member States within the EU15 and most of those within the EU12.

Table 1 Contribution of men and women in full-time and part-time jobs to the overall change in employment, 2003-2010

	2003	2008	2010	2003-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2008-10
EU27	<i>% total employed</i>			<i>Change as % total employed in base year*</i>				
Total, 15-24	10.7	10.2	9.3	0.1	0.0	-0.8	-0.4	-1.2
Total, 25-64	87.7	88.0	88.9	4.5	0.8	-1.1	-0.1	-1.2
Total, 65+	1.6	1.8	1.9	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	4.8	0.9	-1.8	-0.5	-2.3
Men, 25-64	49.2	48.5	48.5	1.9	0.2	-1.0	-0.2	-1.1
Women, 25-64	38.5	39.5	40.4	2.7	0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.0
Men part-time	2.4	2.7	3.1	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3
Women part-time	11.0	11.9	12.4	1.5	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
EU15								
Total, 15-24	11.0	10.6	9.7	0.1	0.0	-0.8	-0.3	-1.1
Total, 25-64	87.7	87.8	88.5	4.2	0.6	-1.1	0.0	-1.1
Total, 65+	1.3	1.6	1.8	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	4.6	0.7	-1.8	-0.3	-2.1
Men, 25-64	49.7	48.5	48.4	1.4	0.0	-1.0	-0.1	-1.1
Women, 25-64	38.0	39.3	40.2	2.8	0.5	-0.1	0.1	0.1
Men part-time	2.4	2.9	3.2	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3
Women part-time	12.8	14.1	14.7	1.9	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
EU12								
Total, 15-24	9.4	8.7	7.7	-0.1	0.0	-0.7	-0.5	-1.2
Total, 25-64	87.8	89.0	90.2	5.9	1.8	-0.9	-0.6	-1.5
Total, 65+	2.7	2.3	2.1	-0.3	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	5.6	1.8	-1.7	-1.2	-2.9
Men, 25-64	47.4	48.6	48.9	3.7	1.1	-0.6	-0.5	-1.1
Women, 25-64	40.4	40.4	41.3	2.2	0.7	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3
Men part-time	2.4	1.9	2.3	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3
Women part-time	3.7	3.3	3.6	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2



*The changes for each group sum to the total change and so show their relative contribution to this.

Source: Eurostat, National accounts and European Labour Force Survey (LFS). Note that the LFS data have been aligned to the national accounts data for total employment to ensure that the figures are as consistent as possible over time.

Employment growth continued in most countries up to mid-2008

In 2008, in most countries, there was continuing growth of jobs in the first part of the year, but by the end of the year, employment was declining in many countries but except in a few cases not by enough to give rise to a reduction in the number employed year on year. In the EU12, growth was in fact higher than in the preceding 4 years. In both the EU15 and EU12, the pattern of employment growth in terms of the jobs taken by men and women and their concentration among those aged 25-64 was similar to that in the preceding 4 years, and all of the net additional jobs in the EU12 were full-time.

2.2 The recession years – job losses hit young people and men especially with a shift to part-time working

Between 2008 and 2010, the number employed declined by just over 2% in the EU15 and by almost 3% in the EU12. In both, a reduction in employment among those aged under 25 contributed greatly to the decline. Indeed, in the EU15, a fall in employment among young people aged 15-24 accounted for over half of the overall decline in the total in work, while in the EU12, it accounted for over 40%. While this may have had a serious impact on the young people concerned and their future life chances, the effect on the distribution of income is likely to have been moderated by the fact that, as indicated above, many in this age group live at home with their parents, whose earnings, accordingly, can be expected to have provided a measure of support³.

On the other hand, all of the reduction in employment over the period among those aged 25-64 in the EU15 was among men and by far the greater part in the EU12. In the majority of cases, these are likely to have been the main earner in the household and, as indicated below, in many cases, the only earner.

At the same time, all of the net reduction in jobs among those aged 25-64 in both the EU12 and EU15 consisted of full-time jobs, while there was some increase in the number of men as well as women employed part-time in the two. Such an increase is even evident for 2009 when most of the reduction in employment occurred. This growth in the proportion of men and women working part-time represented a continuation of previous trends in the EU15. In the EU12, it was a complete reversal. Since it was accompanied by an absolute reduction in people working full-time, the recession, therefore, saw a significant shift from full-time to part-time jobs. This perhaps reflects efforts to maintain people in work or a reluctance of

³ They are in fact assumed to do so by the convention of dividing household income equally between household members (as well as equalising income to take account of the number and age of occupants).



employers in need of more staff to take on people on a full-time basis, or possibly simply a desire to increase flexibility. Whatever the reason, it implies that the decline in the number employed tends to understate the effect on income⁴.

2.3 The experience in selected Member States - pattern of change similar across countries but more pronounced where job losses greatest

Much the same shifts in the age and gender structure of employment are evident in individual Member States in both the EU15 and EU12 as at aggregate level. This is as true in the recession period as in the preceding years of job growth.

In all the countries which experienced among the largest reductions in employment over the recession period, Ireland and Spain in the EU15 and the Baltic States in the EU12, employment growth in the preceding years was relatively high, though it was divided in slightly different ways between men and women and the different age groups. In Spain, women aged 25-64 accounted for almost 60% of the net additional jobs created, though almost 45% of these were part-time (Table 2, which does not show the changes for Latvia, which are similar to those in Estonia).

Table 2 Contribution of men and women in full-time and part-time jobs to the overall change in employment in selected EU Member States, 2003-2010

	2003	2008	2010	2003-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2008-10
Ireland	<i>% total employed</i>			<i>Change as % total employed in base year</i>				
Total, 15-24	16.3	13.5	9.1	1.0	-1.4	-3.6	-2.1	-5.6
Total, 25-64	81.8	84.2	88.6	15.9	0.1	-4.4	-2.0	-6.3
Total, 65+	2.0	2.2	2.4	0.5	0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	17.3	-1.1	-8.2	-4.1	-12.0
Men, 25-64	47.7	47.7	47.6	8.2	-0.5	-4.1	-1.8	-5.8
Women, 25-64	34.0	36.6	40.9	7.6	0.6	-0.2	-0.3	-0.5
Men part-time	1.8	2.4	4.1	0.8	0.2	0.9	0.3	1.2
Women part-time	10.7	11.7	13.4	2.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1
Spain								
Total, 15-24	10.9	9.0	6.5	0.4	-0.9	-2.1	-1.0	-3.1
Total, 25-64	88.5	90.3	92.8	14.7	0.5	-4.6	-1.2	-5.7
Total, 65+	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	15.3	-0.3	-6.7	-2.3	-8.8
Men, 25-64	54.8	52.4	51.9	5.9	-0.5	-3.9	-1.2	-5.0
Women, 25-64	33.7	37.9	40.9	8.8	1.0	-0.7	0.1	-0.6
Men part-time	1.1	1.6	2.1	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3
Women part-time	5.6	8.3	9.4	3.9	0.1	0.5	-0.3	0.3
Estonia								
Total, 15-24	9.4	11.1	8.3	2.5	0.3	-2.6	-1.4	-3.9
Total, 25-64	87.0	85.4	88.3	7.0	0.2	-6.2	-2.6	-8.5
Total, 65+	3.6	3.5	3.3	0.5	-0.2	-0.5	-0.2	-0.6

⁴ There was also a reduction in both hours worked and pay rates for some of those working full-time, which reinforces the effect of the shift to part-time working. This is not considered here and is any case difficult to assess in terms of the scale of its effect on income from the data available.



Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	10.1	0.3	-9.2	-4.1	-13.0
Men, 25-64	43.2	42.7	42.3	3.6	0.3	-4.8	-1.2	-5.9
Women, 25-64	43.8	42.7	46.1	3.4	-0.1	-1.3	-1.4	-2.6
Men part-time	2.1	1.2	2.2	-0.5	-0.2	0.8	-0.1	0.7
Women part-time	3.6	3.5	5.5	0.8	-0.5	1.3	0.0	1.3
Lithuania								
Total, 15-24	8.1	9.4	7.2	1.2	0.5	-2.0	-1.1	-3.0
Total, 25-64	89.8	88.7	91.0	5.5	-1.7	-4.8	-3.8	-8.3
Total, 65+	2.0	2.0	1.8	-0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4
Total employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	6.7	-1.1	-6.9	-5.2	-11.7
Men, 25-64	44.4	43.9	42.8	2.9	-1.0	-4.0	-2.2	-6.1
Women, 25-64	45.4	44.8	48.1	2.7	-0.8	-0.8	-1.6	-2.3
Men part-time	2.6	1.9	2.5	0.4	-1.0	0.7	-0.4	0.4
Women part-time	4.6	3.5	4.2	0.1	-0.9	0.3	-0.1	0.2

Source: Eurostat, National accounts and European Labour Force Survey (LFS). Note that the LFS data have been aligned to the national accounts data for total employment to ensure that the figures are as consistent as possible over time.

In the other countries, more jobs went to men than to women, though in both Estonia and Lithuania (as well as Latvia), women in employment outnumbered men. In Estonia as well, young people under 25 accounted for around a quarter of the increase in employment, much more than in the other countries (though the figure was also relatively high in Latvia).

In the recession period from 2008 to 2010, the growth in employment of young people was more than reversed. In Estonia, some 30% of the overall reduction in the number employed over these two years was accounted for by those under 25, and in Lithuania, 25%. In Spain and Ireland, the figures were even larger. A decline of young people in work was, therefore, responsible for 35% of the overall reduction in employment in Spain and for 46% - almost a half - in Ireland.

In all four countries, however, the largest jobs losses were among men aged 25-64, who accounted for around half or more of the total fall in the number in work. In all four countries too, employment of women also fell over these two years, though only slightly in both Ireland and Spain but more markedly in Estonia and Lithuania. In addition, there was a common shift in the four countries from full-time to part-time jobs for men as well as women, which was especially marked in 2009 when job losses were at their largest.

3. The occupational composition of job gains and losses

3.1 The growth years – a shift to higher level jobs, but more in EU15 than EU12

The growth years between 2003 and 2007 were associated with a significantly larger expansion of employment in higher level jobs – those with higher levels of both skill requirements and pay – than in lower level ones. This was common to countries across the EU15, but less so in the EU12. In the EU15 countries taken together, therefore, jobs for managers, professionals and technicians (or associate professionals) were alone responsible for more than all the growth in employment of men aged 25-64 over the period (contributing 1.6% of the overall growth of 1.4%) (Table 3). The only other jobs to



show an increase were those for semi-skilled workers (machine operators, assembly line workers and drivers). Employment in other jobs either remained much the same or declined.

Changes in the employment of women in the EU15 show a similar division between occupations. The higher level jobs again accounted for much of the employment growth over the 4 years – for 85% of the overall increase in women's employment – though in this case, there was also an expansion in the numbers employed in the relatively low paid sales and service jobs⁵.

In the EU12, the pattern of job growth was similar for women to that in the EU15, in that the higher level occupations accounted for most of the overall increase in employment. There was also a significant expansion in the employment of sales and service workers, though not of elementary workers.

For men in the EU12, however, the occupational composition of employment growth was different than in the EU15. Although there was a significant increase in higher level jobs, this was more than matched by an expansion of jobs for skilled and semi-skilled workers which between them accounted for almost half the growth of men's employment in the EU12 over the period, reflecting the substantial shift of labour-intensive activities in manufacturing from the EU15 to the EU12 during these years. As for women, the employment of elementary workers declined, but this was the only occupational group for which this was the case.

In 2008, the occupational composition of the overall increase in employment in both the EU15 and EU12 was similar to that in the previous four years as it took time in most countries for the economic downturn to lead to job losses.

Table 3 Contribution of broad occupations to overall changes in employment in the EU15 and EU12, 2007-2010

	2003-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2008-10
EU15	<i>Change as % total employed in base year</i>				
<i>Men, 25-64</i>					
Managers	0.5	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Professionals	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Technicians	0.5	0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3
Clerks	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Skilled manual	0.0	0.1	-0.6	-0.2	-0.8
Semi-skilled manual	0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3
Elementary workers	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.2	0.0
Sales+service	-0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
Total	1.4	0.0	-1.0	-0.1	-1.1
<i>Women, 25-64</i>					
Managers	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Professionals	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
Technicians	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Clerks	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.2
Skilled manual	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Semi-skilled manual	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.0
Elementary workers	0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1
Sales+service	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1

⁵ Both the LFS and the EU-SILC show the average earnings of sales and services workers and low skilled elementary workers in the EU to be much the same and lower than for any other occupational group.



Total EU12	2.8	0.5	-0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>Men, 25-64</i>					
Managers	0.4	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2
Professionals	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
Technicians	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
Clerks	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Skilled manual	1.0	0.4	-0.5	-0.6	-1.0
Semi-skilled manual	0.8	0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4
Elementary workers	-0.4	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Sales+service	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Total	3.7	1.1	-0.6	-0.5	-1.1
<i>Women, 25-64</i>					
Managers	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Professionals	1.8	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4
Technicians	-0.3	0.3	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Clerks	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Skilled manual	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.5
Semi-skilled manual	0.3	0.1	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4
Elementary workers	-0.7	0.0	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3
Sales+service	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Total	2.2	0.7	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3

Note: Skilled manual relates to the ISCO 7 category and covers e.g. toolmakers, welders and metal workers; semi-skilled manual relates to ISCO 8 and covers machine operators, assembly line workers and drivers; Elementary workers covers ISCO category 6 (agricultural workers) as well as 9.

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey

3.2 The recession years - jobs for skilled manual workers hit particularly hard

In 2009, as the recession hit jobs, the shift in the occupational composition of employment in the EU15 was broadly the same as in the growth period. While the number of men employed in higher level jobs declined, the decline was less than among skilled and semi-skilled workers, who with elementary workers accounted for all of the overall reduction in employment. For women, the decline in employment was also concentrated among skilled- and semi-skilled workers, while the number employed in the higher level occupations increased slightly. For both men and women, therefore, the occupational pattern of changes in employment in 2009 clearly reflects the differential impact of the recession on manufacturing and construction.

The same is the case for the EU12 countries, though for men, this represents a markedly different pattern of change than occurred during the growth years. The decline in employment among skilled and semi-skilled manual workers was alone equivalent to more than all of the reduction in overall employment of men in 2009. By contrast, employment of professionals continued to increase, together with that of sales and service worker, though to a lesser extent.

For women in the EU12, the concentration of job losses on manual workers was equally marked, with jobs for professionals and associate professionals increasing.

In 2010, employment of men in skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs in the EU15 continued to decline, though at a slower rate, and jobs for professionals continued to increase, though the latter was more than offset by a decline of jobs for associate professionals (or



technicians). By contrast, jobs for elementary workers and sales and service workers increased. Over the two years 2008-2010, therefore, while the main reduction for men was in skilled and semi-skilled jobs, which alone accounted for all of the overall loss of employment in this period, there was also some decline, if very much smaller, in higher level jobs accompanied by an increase of a similar size in, generally low-paid, sales and service jobs. More than half of the jobs concerned, however, were part-time ones.

For women in the EU15, there was a more clear-cut shift towards high level occupations in 2010 and, indeed, over the two years 2008-2010, and a shift away from manual jobs, though with some increase in sales and service jobs. As for men, however, well over half (56%) of the increased number of sales and service jobs taken by women were part-time. At the same time, over two-thirds of the higher level jobs taken by women were also part-time, so that the shift of women towards higher level, and higher paid, jobs is less clear-cut than it first appears.

For men in the EU12, the employment of men in professional and associate professional jobs continued to increase in 2010 while employment in skilled and semi-skilled jobs went on declining at a similar rate as in 2009. Over the two-years 2008-2010, the decline in the latter accounted for more than the overall reduction in employment of men in these countries and the only other jobs to increase apart from those for professionals were for sales and service workers, as in the EU15.

For women in the EU12, the pattern of occupational change in 2010 and the two years 2008-2010 was similar to that of men, with an increase in employment in the higher level jobs and a decline in lower paid manual jobs, accompanied again by an increase in sales and service jobs, which tend equally to be low paid. Moreover, a significant proportion of the latter jobs were part-time – 27% on average which is much more than in the past. As in the EU15, and in marked contrast to the past, an even larger proportion of the net additional higher level jobs filled by women were also part-time (40% on average).

The overall picture shown by the changes in the occupational structure of employment during the crisis period is a shift across the EU away from skilled and semi-skilled jobs with earnings typically around the median, towards, on the one hand, higher level, and higher paid, jobs and, on the other, towards low skilled and lower paid jobs predominantly in services. This holds for both men and women and for EU12 as well as EU15 countries, and it mirrors to some extent the shifts which occurred during the growth years of net employment creation. During these years, however, there was a more clear-cut shift towards higher paid jobs, though there was still evidence of a 'hollowing-out' of the distribution of employment between jobs, with jobs in the middle of the distribution in terms of earnings declining relative to those at the top and bottom end.



At the same time, the increase in the proportion with part-time jobs complicates the issue. At the bottom end of the scale, it means that earnings are even lower than implied by the average for the jobs concerned, so widening inequalities. At the top end of the scale. It means that fewer people will have the higher earnings associated with high level jobs⁶. These different aspects of the changes in the structure of employment which occurred over the recession period are evident in nearly all Member States, though the extent varies according to the scale of the overall decline in employment. They are particularly evident, therefore, in Ireland, Spain and the three Baltic States, where the reduction of jobs in construction was especially marked.

4. Household circumstances of those employed and not employed

4.1 The use of the LFS to indicate the income implications of employment changes

The implications of these labour market developments for income – and more especially for household income which is the usual basis for assessing income distribution and the risk of poverty – clearly depend on the household circumstances of those taking up the net additional jobs created during the growth years and of those losing jobs or not being able to find work in the recession period. The focus here, as above, is on those aged 25-64 in order to leave out of account those younger than this, who, to a large extent, are still likely to be in education or initial vocational training and who for the most part in all countries still live with their parents, as well as older people, most of whom have retired from working.

In order to examine the link between household circumstances and labour market developments – specifically, the growth and contraction in employment – a measure needs to be devised to represent the combined involvement of household members in paid work. A means of doing this is through an indicator of household work intensity, which measures the extent to which household members who can be expected to be in work are actually employed. A value of 1 for this indicator denotes a situation where everyone of working age is in full-time employment, a value of zero, where no-one is employed at all. The indicator then varies between these two extremes according to the extent to which not everyone of working-age is employed full-time, either because they work part-time or do not work at all. The usual source of the calculation of work intensity is the EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) which contains details not only of the current employment status of household members but also their status each month during the preceding year, including, if they were employed, whether they worked part-time or full-time.

⁶ The changes in the structure of employment over both the growth period and the recession years are in line with the results of a study by the European Foundation in Dublin which indicated that the main feature of both periods was a loss of middle-level jobs in terms of earnings, with higher level jobs expanding in all countries during the growth years and continuing to increase or contracting by least during the recession and lower level jobs also increasing many countries, though by less than higher level ones. The study, however, fails to distinguish between part-time and full-time jobs and to pick up the significant shift which occurred over the recession years in particular. See: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef1141.htm>.



The EU-SILC data, therefore, enable a link to be drawn between the labour market involvement of those living in particular households and income, as well as their risk of poverty (or having income below 60% of the national median). In practice, for most countries across the EU, this risk of poverty increases significantly as household work intensity falls and is particularly high for those living in households where work intensity is zero (Jobless) or less than 0.5 (typically no-one employed full-time) – and in some cases where it is no higher than 0.5 (i.e. where there is only one wage earner in a couple household or where someone living alone works only part-time, which is often the case for lone parents). The extent to which the risk of poverty varies with work intensity depends to a large extent on the scale of support available for those not in paid work, typically because they are unemployed or in some cases because they have a serious disability. In Member States with a well-developed and relatively generous social welfare system, the risk of poverty tends to be much lower in households with zero or low work intensity than in other countries, but it is still significantly higher than for households with a higher level of work intensity. Irrespective of the effect on the risk of poverty, income tends to vary closely with the work intensity of households.

Unfortunately, as indicated above, it is not possible to use the EU-SILC directly in the present analysis as income data are not yet available for the recession years. But it can be used indirectly to throw light on the income implications of employment changes derived from the LFS. The latter, which is much more up-to-date than the EU-SILC, does not collect data on income⁷, but it does compile data by household and, accordingly, can be used to identify developments in the work intensity of households, if only up to a point. More specifically, the LFS data relate only to the current employment status of respondents (or more precisely in the reference week of the survey) and do not cover their status over a longer period of time, which clearly might be subject to change. Unlike the EU-SIC data, therefore, the LFS data gives only an approximate indication of the work intensity of households over the income year.

Nevertheless, examination of the EU-SILC data indicates that:

- i. the employment situation of household members at any one point in time is a reasonably close reflection of their situation over the year;
- ii. much more importantly for present purposes, there is a close relationship between the employment status of household members at the time of the survey and their income level or risk of poverty (as there is between work intensity as usually measured and the risk of poverty);
- iii. equally importantly, the work intensity of households calculated from the EU-SILC data on the employment situation of respondents at the time of the survey is very similar to that calculated from the LFS data for the same year; accordingly, the EU-SILC data can be assumed to give a reasonable approximation of the income levels of households with different levels of work intensity as identified by the LFS (see Annex Figure A.2).

⁷ Since 2009, it does collect data on earnings, though not in a form which enables them to be used for the present purpose.



The second and third points taken together mean that the LFS data can be used to assess the implications of changes in employment for household income and, more specifically, for changes in the relative numbers at risk of poverty.

The LFS data (which has been specially extracted by Eurostat from the survey returns), therefore, enable households to be divided into 5 groups in terms of their level of work intensity:

- zero (no-one of working-age employed, or jobless)
- low (work intensity of less than 0.5, typically one person of a couple working part-time)
- half (work intensity of 0.5, typically one person of a couple working full-time)
- half-to-full (work intensity above 0.5 but less than 1, typically one person working full-time and one part-time)
- full (work intensity of 1, i.e. everyone of working-age employed full-time).

It should be noted that because of a lack of data at household level on the number of hours worked, it is possible to identify only whether someone was employed full-time or part-time and not how long they worked if the latter⁸. This means that it is not possible to distinguish between someone working 'long' part-time hours (i.e. almost full-time) and someone working only a few hours a week (see Box for more details of the calculation).

Despite these limitations, as indicated above, the estimates of work intensity calculated from the LFS data seem to vary closely with household income. If the same classification method is applied to the EU-SILC data, therefore, the proportion of people at risk of poverty (i.e. with income below 60% of the national median) is very much larger in all countries for households with zero or low work intensity than for those with a higher level (Figure 1 – see Annex, Table A.1 for details for countries).

Calculation of household work intensity

The work intensity of households is calculated from Labour Force Survey data which distinguish the household characteristics of individuals in terms of the number of people living in the household at the time of the survey, their employment status and whether they work part-time or full-time. Accordingly, they take no account of changes during the year, which are implicitly assumed not to have occurred. Student households, i.e. those occupied only by those aged 15-24 in full-time education, are excluded from the calculation. Although the focus is on those aged 25-64, work intensity is defined in terms of all those of working age (i.e. 15-64) living in the households, excluding student households.

Households with 'full work intensity' are then defined as those in which all those of working age (i.e. 15-64) living in the household are employed full-time. These can be one-person households, couple households or ones with three or more people of this age, with or without children.

Households with half-to-full work intensity are those in which one person of a couple is employed full-time and the other is employed part-time or, in larger households, where at least one person is employed full-time and all the others are employed, whether full-time or part-time.

⁸As noted, the household data used in the analysis here were kindly provided by Eurostat through a special extraction of the basic LFS data. There were, however, limits to the detail which could be provided without infringing confidentiality agreements with Member States.




Households with work intensity of a half are those in which someone living alone works part-time, couple households with one person working full-time and the others not employed or larger households where only one person is employed full-time and only one other is employed part-time.

Households with low work intensity are couple households with one person employed part-time and the other not working or large households with one person working full-time and the others not working or one or two people working part-time and the others(s) not working.

Jobless households are those where no-one of working age is employed.

Figure 1 Proportion of people aged 25-64 at risk of poverty by work intensity of household (on LFS definition), 2008 income year (% total in each work intensity group)



In the EU12, therefore, the risk of poverty was only slightly less, on average, in the 2008 income year for those aged 25-64 living in households with no-one of working-age employed (i.e. jobless households) than in ones where only one person in a couple household was working part-time. In addition, the risk was also slightly higher for those in households with work intensity of half-to-full (one person working full-time, one part-time in a couple household) than for those in single earner couple households. It is only in households where both people in a couple household work full-time, therefore, that the risk of poverty was relatively low in the EU12.

In the EU15, the proportion at risk of poverty declined progressively as work intensity increased, though it was still some 15% for those living in single earner couple households. In the EU15, in contrast to the EU12, the proportion at risk of poverty was only marginally higher in households with half-to-full work intensity than in those with full work intensity.

4.2 Experience in the growth years –increasing numbers living in high work intensity households but less of a decline in those in low work intensity ones


In practice, the employment growth which occurred over the years 2003-2007 was associated with an increase in both the employment rate of those aged 25-64 and the proportion of these living in households where all those of working age (taken here as all those aged 15-64 excluding those living in student households) were in employment. There was also a reduction across the EU as a whole in the proportion living in jobless households – i.e. in households where no-one of working age was in paid work – but this



was by no means general across Member States. Indeed, the job growth over this period had the effect more of increasing the number in work, or the time spent working, in households where there was already somebody in employment than reducing the number of people in households where no-one was in work or only one person was employed part-time.

This is especially evident in the EU15, where, despite the increase in employment of those aged 25-64 (the employment rate increasing from just under 70% to 72.5%), the proportion living in jobless households declined only slightly over the 5-years 2003-2007 (by 1 percentage point) while the proportion living in low work intensity households remained unchanged (Figure 2 – see Annex Table A.2 for details by Member State).

Figure 2 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households, 2003 and 2007 (% total)



The main difference between the EU12 and EU15 is the larger proportion of people living in half-to-full work intensity households (i.e. those where one person of a couple works full-time and the other part-time), reflecting the much greater number of women working part-time in the latter. This proportion increased over the period in the EU15 (but not in the EU12) as one-earner couple households became two-earner ones. At the same time, the proportion living in full work intensity households in the EU15 also increased as second earners (usually women) shifted from part-time to full-time employment.

The main change in the pattern of work intensity in the EU15, therefore, was in one-earner couple households becoming two-earner ones rather than in the proportion living in zero or low work intensity households declining. This change was particularly marked in Greece, Spain and Italy, as well as Luxembourg, in all of which the proportion of those aged 25-64 living in jobless households changed relatively little over the period (in Italy, it actually increased slightly) but where the proportion living in high work intensity households rose significantly as the proportion in half work intensity households declined (in Spain, by as much as 7.5 percentage points). Many of those likely to be on low incomes in these four countries, therefore, as well as in a number of others, were left unaffected by the job growth which occurred over this period (see Annex Table A.2).

In the EU12, job growth had more of an effect on those living in workless households, the proportion declining from 16.5% in 2003 to just under 14% in 2007, while the proportion living in low work intensity households (where, as indicated above, the risk of poverty is



much the same) also went down (a combined reduction of over 3 percentage points or around 1.8 million). At the same time, the proportion living in half work intensity households declined only slightly, as did those living in half-to-full work intensity ones, reflecting the low level of part-time working. The counterpart of the reduction at the bottom end of the scale was, therefore, an increase in those living in households where everyone of working age was in full-time employment, where the risk of poverty was at its lowest and where the level of income was relatively high on average.

There are, however, exceptions, in particular, Lithuania, where despite the substantial growth in employment, the proportion of people living in jobless households hardly declined at all and the main effect was on households where there was already someone working (the proportion living in households with half work intensity declining by around 6.5 percentage points and those living in full work intensity households increasing by even more).

There are also signs of increasing inequality in countries which experienced little or no growth of employment over this period, specifically Hungary and Portugal, where the relative number living in both jobless and low work intensity households increased while those living in full or half-to-full work intensity households remained much the same. This suggests that the main source of the increase in zero and low work intensity households were people in single earner couple households (half work intensity ones) who already had relatively low incomes.

4.3 Experience in the crisis years – increasing numbers living in low work intensity households but less decline in those living in high work intensity ones


The recession which struck the EU in 2008 and the job losses which followed led to an increase in the number of people living in both jobless and low work intensity households virtually throughout the EU. The only countries to avoid this were Germany and Luxembourg, where employment rose over the period 2008-2010, and Hungary, where a decline in those living in jobless households was accompanied by a larger increase in those living in low work intensity ones – though since there is little difference in the risk of poverty between the two, this is unlikely to have much effect on the overall numbers at risk. At the same time, the relative number of people living in full work intensity households declined in all countries except Luxembourg and Hungary. The relative scale of these two tendencies and the way that the reduction in employment was distributed across households gives an indication of its effect on the distribution of income.

In the EU15, on average, the reduction in the proportion of 25-64 year-olds living in full work intensity households was on much the same scale as the increase in those living in households with half-to-full work intensity (Figure 3 – see Annex Table A.3 for details by country). Overall, therefore, there was only a marginal fall in the EU15 in the relative number living in households with relatively high work intensity, typically with both people in a couple household in employment, even though one might work part-time where previously they worked full-time. The decline in the proportion living in half work intensity (i.e. single earner) households was much the same as the increase in those living in jobless or low work intensity ones. Much of the increase in the latter, therefore, might well be made up of those previously in single earner households with, accordingly, relatively low income because of this before the economic downturn. (In practice, the occupational analysis below confirms that many of those losing their jobs during the recession years, a large number of whom were skilled manual workers in construction



and manufacturing, lived disproportionately in single earner households⁹.) Overall the evidence suggests a widening of income inequalities, with those with incomes already below average losing out most.

Figure 3 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households, 2008 and 2010 (% total)



In the EU12, on the other hand, job losses seem to have been more evenly distributed across households. In contrast to the pattern of change in the EU15, the proportion living in households with high work intensity (above half), declined in the two years 2008-2010 by more than the rise in the proportion living in zero or low work intensity households. Accordingly, there was a small increase rather than a reduction in those living in households with half work intensity, suggesting that in some of the couple households experiencing job losses at least one person remained in full-time employment.

At the same time, there was also a slightly larger increase in the proportion living in low work intensity households in the EU12 over the period than in the EU15, which reflects the expansion of part-time working in these countries indicated above. As also indicated above, however, such households in most countries have much the same risk of poverty as those where no-one is in work, though income levels might be slightly higher.

This more even distribution of the reduction in employment across households, which is reflected in a bigger decline in those living in high work intensity households than in low intensity ones and, correspondingly, in an increase in those living in households with half work intensity (one earner couple households) is a common feature of the EU12 countries. It is particularly apparent in Bulgaria and the three Baltic States and to a slightly lesser extent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (see Annex Table A.3). It is not evident in Poland (where the proportion living in high work intensity households declined only marginally and the proportion living in low work intensity households increased by around 1.5 percentage points), Romania or Slovenia.

⁹ Although such workers tended to have earnings around the median, the fact that many of them were the only source of employment income tended to push down their household income relative to others.




It is not evident either in most EU15 countries, where, as at the aggregate level, the increase in the proportion living in low work intensity households was larger than the reduction in the proportion in high work intensity ones. The main exceptions are Portugal and Finland, where over the two years, the reverse was the case and the proportion living in one-earner couple households increased more than marginally. In most of EU15 countries, therefore, the reduction in employment led to a larger increase in people living in zero or low work intensity households than if it had been spread evenly across households.

A comparison of developments in Ireland and Lithuania illustrate this (Figure 4). Both countries experienced much the same reduction in the employment rate of 25-64 year-olds between 2008 and 2010 (a decline of just under 7 percentage points, slightly more in Lithuania than Ireland). In Lithuania, this led to an increase in the proportion of people living in zero and low work intensity households combined of just over 6 percentage points; in Ireland, it led to an increase of just over 9 percentage points, more than in Latvia where the decline in employment rate was significantly larger at almost 10 percentage points. Moreover, the increase in the proportion of those living in low work intensity households was much the same in Spain as in Lithuania, but here the reduction in the employment rate was much less, at 5 percentage points.



Figure 4 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households in Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Lithuania, 2008 and 2010 (% total)



In consequence, a given decline in employment, just as an increase during growth years, can have very different implications for the relative number of people living in jobless or low work intensity households – and accordingly with no access, or only very limited access, to income from employment – depending on how it is distributed across households. This depends, in turn, of course, on the household characteristics of those losing their jobs during the recession and unable to find new ones. The implication is that in Ireland more than in Lithuania, the people concerned, mainly men working in construction or manufacturing, either tended to live alone or in households where they were the only wage earner, except perhaps for someone working part-time. These household characteristics are examined below together with those of other occupation groups before turning to examine the implications for the relative numbers at risk of poverty of these changes in the work intensity of households.

5. Household circumstances of those employed in different jobs

5.1 Pre-crisis – household work intensity reinforcing earnings differences

As implied by the above analysis, the household characteristics of those who lost their jobs during the recession can have a significant effect on the outcome so far as the distribution of income is concerned and the relative numbers at risk of poverty. The concern here is to examine the way these characteristics tend to vary between occupational groups and, in particular, between those employed in higher level, and higher paid, occupations as opposed to those employed in lower paid ones. As indicated below, this variation tends to accentuate differences in earnings levels and to reinforce the disproportionate effect of the recession on those employed in manual jobs.

To simplify the analysis – and the presentation of the results – occupations are aggregated into 5 groups:



- Managers and professionals (ISCO 1 and 2), the highest level occupations in terms of qualification requirements and earnings¹⁰;
- Technicians or associate professionals (ISCO 3), the next highest level ones in both terms, with average earnings well above the median;
- Clerks and office worker (ISCO 4) who have an average level of earnings around the median
- Skilled and semi-skilled manual workers (ISCO 7 and 8), each with similar earnings levels also around the median;
- Elementary and agricultural workers (ISCO 6 and 9), with the lowest earnings on average;
- Sales and service workers (ISCO 5), with earnings much the same as elementary workers on average.

There is a clear relationship between the jobs that people do and their household characteristics in terms of work intensity. People in higher level occupations, working as managers or professionals, therefore, are significantly more likely to live in households where everyone of working age is in employment than those who do lower level jobs, especially those employed in elementary ones. In the EU15, just over 54% of managers and professionals lived in households where everyone of working age was employed full-time in 2007, before the onset of the recession, as opposed to just under 47% of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers and to only 41% of elementary and agricultural workers (Table 4). The difference is even wider in the EU12, where almost 66% of managers and professionals lived in households where everyone was in work as compared with just 45% of elementary and agricultural workers¹¹.

Conversely, more elementary and agricultural workers than those in high level jobs lived in households with low work intensity, perhaps because they were employed part-time and no-one else in the household was in work, as well as in households with half work intensity, in most cases because their spouse or partner was not in employment. In the EU15, just over a third of this occupational group lived in such households, 10 percentage points more than in the case of managers and professionals, and in the EU12, 42%, over 12 percentage points more than the latter group.

It should be noted that a larger proportion of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers lived in households where they were the sole wage earner – just over a third in 2007 in the EU15 and almost 45% in the EU12 – than any other of the occupational groups. The proportion of sole wage earners, moreover, was particularly large in the two EU12 countries which suffered the

¹⁰ Note that earnings are defined here as the average monthly earnings of people employed full-time.

¹¹ Sales and service workers do not conform to the general relationship between the level of occupations and the work intensity of household. Such workers, on average, have among the lowest earnings of all occupational groups but the proportion of them living in households with full work intensity was much the same in 2007 as skilled and semi-skilled manual workers in the EU15 and in the EU12, much larger. This is a reflection of the relatively large number of women employed in these kinds of job, which makes it more likely if they are in work that their partner is also employed than in the case of occupational groups dominated by men. By the same token, more of them, especially in the EU15, tend to live in households with half-to-full work intensity, where one part of a couple works part-time, usually themselves, and fewer of them tend to live in half work intensity households, or one earner couple households.



biggest loss of skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs. In Ireland, therefore, almost 40% of workers in these jobs were sole wage earners before the recession and in Spain, just over a half.

Table 4 Division of those employed in broad occupation groups between households with different levels of work intensity, 2003-2007

ISCO	% Total of each group											
	Low			Half			Half-to-full			Full		
	2003	2007	2003-7	2003	2007	2003-7	2003	2007	2003-7	2003	2007	2003-7
EU15												
1+2	2.0	1.8	-0.2	26.6	23.3	-3.3	18.6	20.7	2.1	52.9	54.3	1.4
3	2.3	2.4	0.1	25.6	21.3	-4.3	20.0	22.8	2.8	52.1	53.4	1.3
4	2.9	3.0	0.1	24.6	21.8	-2.7	21.9	23.5	1.6	50.7	51.6	0.9
7+8	2.0	1.8	-0.3	39.6	33.7	-5.9	15.5	17.9	2.4	42.8	46.6	3.7
6+9	6.0	6.3	0.3	36.2	32.6	-3.6	18.7	20.2	1.5	39.2	41.0	1.7
5	4.7	4.7	0.0	27.8	25.4	-2.4	22.8	24.1	1.3	44.7	45.8	1.1
Total	3.0	3.0	0.0	30.5	26.4	-4.1	19.1	21.2	2.1	47.5	49.5	2.0
EU12												
1+2	1.0	1.1	0.1	31.4	29.6	-1.7	3.5	3.6	0.1	64.2	65.7	1.5
3	1.5	1.4	-0.2	33.7	31.7	-2.0	3.2	3.0	-0.2	61.6	63.9	2.3
4	2.0	1.6	-0.4	34.3	34.3	0.0	3.9	3.3	-0.5	59.8	60.7	0.9
7+8	2.6	2.1	-0.5	46.1	44.5	-1.6	3.0	2.8	-0.2	48.2	50.6	2.4
6+9	6.0	5.6	-0.4	42.0	42.0	0.0	7.2	7.1	-0.1	44.8	45.2	0.5
5	3.0	2.2	-0.8	40.6	37.0	-3.7	4.1	3.6	-0.5	52.3	57.3	4.9
Total	2.9	2.5	-0.5	39.5	37.8	-1.7	4.2	3.9	-0.3	53.3	55.8	2.5
EU27												
1+2	1.8	1.7	-0.1	27.4	25.5	-1.9	16.1	16.6	0.5	54.8	56.2	1.5
3	2.2	2.2	0.1	27.0	25.0	-2.1	17.0	18.1	1.1	53.8	54.7	0.9
4	2.8	2.9	0.1	25.7	25.0	-0.7	19.7	20.3	0.5	51.8	51.9	0.0
7+8	2.2	2.0	-0.1	41.3	38.7	-2.6	12.3	12.9	0.6	44.2	46.3	2.1
6+9	6.0	6.0	0.1	38.0	36.7	-1.3	15.1	15.6	0.4	40.9	41.7	0.8
5	4.4	4.3	-0.1	30.3	28.9	-1.5	19.1	19.1	0.1	46.2	47.7	1.5
Total	3.0	2.9	-0.1	32.4	30.4	-2.0	15.9	16.6	0.6	48.7	50.2	1.4

Note: 1+2=Managers+professionals; 3=Associate professionals, technicians;

4+7+8=Clerks, skilled+semi-skilled manual; 6+9 Elementary+agricultural; 5=Sales+service

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and authors' calculations

5.2 The growth years –increase in household work intensity for all occupational groups

Over the 4 years of employment growth from 2003 to 2007, there was a general shift upwards in the EU15 in the work intensity of households for all the occupational groups, in the sense that the proportion of those living in households with full or half-to-full work intensity increased for all of them. Though small, these shifts tended to widen income inequalities in the EU15, insofar as there was a slightly bigger increase over the 4 years in the proportion living in high work-intensity households among those in higher paid jobs than among those in lower paid ones. At the same time, there was also a bigger increase in the worker intensity of households of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers with earnings around the middle of the distribution.

Changes in household work intensity over the 2003-2007 period varied more across occupational groups in the EU12 than in the EU15. The largest shift was for sales and service workers for whom the proportion living in households with everyone in work increased by twice as much as for any other group. On the other hand, the proportion



of elementary and agricultural workers living in such households increased only marginally and by much less than for other groups. For these, the proportion living in couple households where they were the only wage earner remained unchanged over the 4 years. In 2007, it was still the case, therefore, that 42% of such workers lived in this kind of household, though this was a smaller proportion than for skilled and semi-skilled manual workers (almost 45% as noted above).

These shifts in household work intensity in the EU12 are likely to have had only a marginal effect on the distribution of income. The increase in the proportion of sales and service workers living in high work intensity households relative to other occupation groups was, therefore, offset by the relative decline in elementary workers, who were almost twice as numerous, living in such households. Overall, therefore, the change in household work intensity over the period was much the same for lower paid occupational groups as for higher paid ones.

5.3 The crisis years – household work intensity declining by more for those in lower paid jobs than for those in higher paid ones

As indicated above, skilled and semi-skilled workers were disproportionately affected by the recession and suffered bigger job losses than those employed in other occupations. At the same time, as also indicated above, a relatively large proportion of such workers lived in single earner households making them especially vulnerable to a major drop in income if they lost their jobs. This helps to explain why in many countries, especially in the EU15, the increase in the relative number of people aged 25-64 living in low work intensity households exceeded the reduction in the employment rate of this age group. The issue examined here concerns the household work intensity of those that remained in employment over the crisis period and how it changed between 2008 and 2010, the focus being on the changes experienced by those in lower level jobs as opposed to those in higher level ones.

In the EU15, the relative number of people employed as sales and service workers or as elementary workers living in households with everyone of working age in full-time employment declined by more than in the case of those in higher level jobs (by around 2.5 percentage points on average as opposed to 1.5 percentage points) (Table 5). Moreover, while this decline for those in higher level jobs was associated largely with an increase in those living in households with half-to-full work intensity – with one person of a couple working full-time, the other part-time – for those in lower level jobs, the main counterpart was an increase in those living in households where they were the sole wage earner, whether working full-time or part-time (i.e. in half work intensity and low work intensity households). Accordingly, for those in lower paid jobs in the EU15, the recession meant that there was a greater chance of them becoming the only earner in the household than for those in higher paid jobs, with consequent implications for the distribution of income.

For those employed as skilled or semi-skilled manual workers, who managed to remain in work, the main change over the recession period was an increase in the proportion living in high work intensity households, especially in those with one person working full-time and the other part-time, combined with a similar reduction in those living in half work intensity ones. This suggests a tendency for the second person in a household to take up work, in most cases part-time work, where previously they were not working at all,

perhaps to compensate for a reduction in the earnings of the other person in the household.

Table 5 Division of those employed in broad occupation groups between households with different levels of work intensity, 2008-2010

	Low			Half			Half-to-full			Full		
	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10
EU15												
1+2	1.7	1.8	0.2	24.0	23.3	-0.7	19.5	21.6	2.0	54.8	53.3	-1.5
3	2.3	2.7	0.4	23.2	22.8	-0.3	20.8	22.4	1.6	53.8	52.1	-1.6
4	2.9	3.3	0.4	23.4	23.2	-0.2	22.8	24.1	1.3	50.8	49.3	-1.6
7+8	2.1	2.4	0.3	35.7	33.7	-2.0	17.0	18.3	1.3	45.3	45.7	0.4
6+9	6.0	7.3	1.3	33.7	34.3	0.6	19.5	19.9	0.4	40.8	38.5	-2.3
5	4.8	5.7	0.9	26.5	27.5	1.0	23.0	23.6	0.6	45.8	43.3	-2.5
Total	3.0	3.5	0.5	27.8	27.2	-0.6	20.0	21.4	1.4	49.2	48.0	-1.3
EU12												
1+2	1.0	1.4	0.4	29.1	30.1	1.0	3.5	3.7	0.3	66.5	64.8	-1.6
3	1.2	1.6	0.4	31.4	32.4	1.0	3.2	3.8	0.6	64.2	62.2	-2.0
4	1.4	1.8	0.4	33.4	34.7	1.3	3.3	3.7	0.5	62.0	59.8	-2.2
7+8	2.1	2.6	0.5	43.6	46.0	2.4	2.7	2.9	0.2	51.6	48.5	-3.1
6+9	5.4	6.9	1.4	41.9	43.3	1.4	6.9	6.2	-0.7	45.8	43.7	-2.1
5	2.0	2.5	0.5	36.3	38.5	2.2	3.5	4.1	0.6	58.2	54.9	-3.3
Total	2.3	2.9	0.6	37.2	38.6	1.4	3.8	4.0	0.2	56.6	54.5	-2.2
EU27												
1+2	1.5	1.8	0.2	24.9	24.4	-0.5	16.6	18.7	2.1	56.9	55.1	-1.8
3	2.1	2.5	0.4	24.6	24.2	-0.4	17.8	19.8	1.9	55.5	53.6	-2.0
4	2.7	3.2	0.4	24.7	24.5	-0.2	20.2	21.8	1.6	52.3	50.5	-1.8
7+8	2.1	2.4	0.4	37.8	36.5	-1.3	13.1	14.8	1.7	47.0	46.3	-0.7
6+9	5.9	7.2	1.3	36.0	36.5	0.5	15.9	16.5	0.6	42.2	39.8	-2.4
5	4.3	5.1	0.9	28.4	29.4	1.0	19.0	20.2	1.1	48.3	45.3	-3.0
Total	2.8	3.4	0.5	29.8	29.2	-0.5	16.6	18.3	1.7	50.8	49.1	-1.7

Note: 1+2=Managers+professionals; 3=Associate professionals, technicians;

4+7+8=Clerks, skilled+semi-skilled manual; 6+9 Elementary+agricultural; 5=Sales+service

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and authors' calculations

In the EU12, the changes in the household work intensity of the different occupational groups over the recession period were similar to those in the EU15, but slightly less pronounced. The proportion of those employed in the lower level occupations (in ISCO groups 5,6 and 9) living in higher work intensity households declined by more than for those in higher level occupations, mirrored by a larger increase in those living in households with half or low work intensity. In these countries, unlike in the EU15, for those in skilled or semi-skilled jobs who remained in work, the proportion living in high work intensity households declined to much the same extent as for those in lower-level jobs. The implication, therefore, is that the shifts in household work intensity for those employed in different kinds of job over the 2008-2010 period had the effect of widening the distribution of income, of increasing the household income of those at the upper end of the distribution relative to those lower down.

5.4 Experience in selected countries - reduction in household work intensity especially large for lower paid workers in countries with biggest job losses

The differential effect of the recession on the household work intensity of different occupational groups described above is much more apparent in countries where the decline in employment was greatest over the period. It was particularly marked in Ireland, where the proportion of those employed as managers and professionals living in

households with everyone of working age employed full-time declined by less than 1 percentage point between 2008 and 2010. In stark contrast, for those employed as elementary workers or sales and service workers the proportion declined by around 8 percentage points. Equally, the proportion of the latter living in low work intensity households, with someone employed only part-time, increased by 5-6 percentage points, as compared with an increase of under 1 percentage point for managers and professionals (Table 6).

Table 6 Division of those employed in broad occupation groups between households with different levels of work intensity in selected countries, 2008-2010

	<i>% Total of each group</i>											
	Low			Half			Half-to-full			Full		
	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10	2008	2010	2008-10
IE												
1+2	1.4	2.1	0.7	25.6	26.5	0.9	16.7	15.8	-1.0	56.3	55.5	-0.7
3	2.2	3.6	1.4	25.5	27.3	1.8	17.0	18.4	1.5	55.4	50.7	-4.7
4	2.9	5.1	2.1	23.1	26.2	3.0	22.2	20.1	-2.1	51.7	48.7	-3.1
7+8	1.8	5.1	3.3	38.5	38.2	-0.4	13.5	16.2	2.7	46.2	40.5	-5.7
6+9	5.7	11.4	5.7	36.2	38.8	2.6	15.4	14.8	-0.6	42.6	34.9	-7.7
5	4.9	10.1	5.2	27.5	32.3	4.7	19.6	18.1	-1.5	48.0	39.5	-8.4
Total	2.7	5.2	2.5	29.3	30.5	1.2	17.1	16.9	-0.2	50.9	47.4	-3.5
ES												
1+2	1.5	2.4	0.9	34.1	33.2	-0.9	8.8	9.0	0.3	55.6	55.3	-0.3
3	1.9	2.4	0.5	33.4	34.3	0.9	9.2	10.5	1.3	55.4	52.8	-2.6
4	2.4	3.0	0.6	34.2	33.2	-0.9	12.0	12.3	0.3	51.5	51.5	0.1
7+8	2.0	3.2	1.2	50.9	49.6	-1.3	9.0	9.0	0.0	38.1	38.2	0.0
6+9	5.9	9.0	3.1	42.9	45.5	2.6	13.5	12.1	-1.3	37.7	33.4	-4.3
5	3.7	6.4	2.7	35.5	39.5	4.0	12.3	12.0	-0.2	48.6	42.0	-6.6
Total	2.8	4.4	1.6	39.9	40.0	0.1	10.5	10.5	0.1	46.8	45.0	-1.8
EE												
1+2	0.7	1.6	0.9	21.4	27.4	6.0	8.0	5.7	-2.3	69.9	65.3	-4.6
3	1.0	2.7	1.7	22.1	27.5	5.5	5.6	6.1	0.5	71.3	63.6	-7.7
4	0.5	3.2	2.7	20.8	24.1	3.3	5.0	4.8	-0.2	73.6	67.8	-5.8
7+8	0.7	2.1	1.4	28.1	35.3	7.2	3.2	4.1	0.9	68.0	58.5	-9.5
6+9	3.1	6.1	3.0	30.1	36.1	6.0	5.5	7.0	1.5	61.3	50.8	-10.4
5	0.6	1.8	1.2	20.7	32.4	11.7	5.3	9.2	4.0	73.4	56.6	-16.9
Total	1.0	2.5	1.5	24.5	30.9	6.5	5.4	5.8	0.4	69.1	60.7	-8.4
LT												
1+2	0.8	1.1	0.3	23.4	26.0	2.6	4.1	3.4	-0.7	71.8	69.5	-2.3
3	0.9	2.2	1.3	22.2	28.1	5.9	4.0	3.6	-0.3	72.9	66.0	-6.9
4	1.8	3.9	2.1	28.0	26.8	-1.2	3.5	5.3	1.8	66.7	64.0	-2.6
7+8	1.0	2.3	1.2	32.1	37.3	5.2	2.7	4.0	1.3	64.2	56.5	-7.8
6+9	3.6	6.8	3.1	33.3	39.2	5.9	7.0	7.4	0.3	56.0	46.6	-9.4
5	1.6	2.6	0.9	27.7	35.3	7.5	4.1	4.3	0.2	66.6	57.9	-8.7
Total	1.4	2.7	1.3	27.9	32.2	4.3	4.0	4.4	0.3	66.6	60.7	-5.9

Note: 1+2=Managers+professionals; 3=Associate professionals, technicians;



4+7+8=Clerks, skilled+semi-skilled manual; 6+9 Elementary+agricultural; 5=Sales+service
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and authors' calculations

The same pattern of change is also evident, if to a slightly lesser extent, in Spain, where the proportion of those employed in lower level jobs living in high work intensity households (full or full-to-half) declined by around 6-7 percentage points whereas the proportion of managers and professionals living in such households remained unchanged. The proportion of elementary workers and sales service workers living in low work intensity households or in those with only one person employed, therefore, increased by the same amount, while for managers and professionals, it remained the same.


The same tendency is equally evident in Estonia and Lithuania, where in each case the proportion living in full work intensity households declined by much more for those in lower paid jobs than for those in higher paid ones.

6. Implications of job losses for risk of poverty

Reduction in household work intensity implies increase in numbers at risk of poverty in most countries

The changes in the work intensity of households described above suggest that the proportion of people at risk of poverty, in the sense of having disposable income below 60% of the national median, has increased during the recession years across the EU and significantly so in the countries which suffered the biggest decline in employment. The effect on those at risk of poverty, therefore, can be estimated directly from the shifts in the relative number of people living in households with different levels of work intensity between 2008 and 2010, on the assumption that the average risk associated with these different levels remained the same in 2010 as in 2008 (see Figure 1 above). In this case, the coverage can be extended both to all those of working age (i.e. 16-64) and to children living in the households concerned. The only group left out of account, apart from students living together in households, who are relatively small in number, are older people of 65 and above, for whom the overall proportion at risk of poverty is assumed to be unchanged.

Figure 5 Population at risk of poverty in 2008 and estimated for 2010 from changes in work intensity of households (% total)



On these assumptions, the effect of the change in the work intensity of households resulting from the decline in employment is to increase the relative number at risk of poverty in the EU as a whole over the two years by an estimated 0.5 of a percentage point (from 16.3% to 16.8%) and by slightly more in the EU12 than in the EU15 (Figure 5 and Table 7, in which countries are ranked by the increase in the proportion of people at risk). This increase may not sound much but, it implies an additional 2.5 million people in the EU at risk of poverty.

Table 7 Population at risk of poverty in 2008 and estimated for 2010 from changes in work intensity of households (% total)

	2008	2010
LU	14.9	14.7
DE	15.5	15.3
MT	15.3	15.2
CY	16.2	16.3
AT	12.0	12.2
PL	17.1	17.3
BE	14.6	14.9
RO	22.4	22.7
CZ	8.6	9.0
FR	12.9	13.3
HU	12.4	12.9
NL	11.1	11.6
IT	18.4	19.0
FI	13.8	14.4
SI	11.3	12.0
UK	17.3	18.0
PT	17.9	18.7
EL	19.7	20.5

SK	11.0	12.0
BG	21.8	23.5
ES	19.5	21.3
IE	15.0	17.0
LT	20.6	23.8
EE	19.7	23.4
LV	25.7	30.2
EU12	17.1	17.8
EU15	16.1	16.5
EU27	16.3	16.8



The biggest increase is in the three Baltic States where the proportion with income below 60% of the median is estimated to rise by between just over 3 percentage points (in Lithuania) and 4.5 percentage points (in Latvia). In Ireland and Spain, the increase is less, but it is still significant at around 2 percentage points. At the other extreme, the proportion with income this low falls marginally in Luxembourg, Germany and Malta, where the average work intensity of households increased slightly.

These estimates of course relate only to the effect of the shift in the work intensity of households – of a general reduction in those in employment - and leave out of account any change in the risk of poverty stemming

from other sources, such as from a reduction in the earnings of people in work for doing a particular job or from a change in social benefits. It is evident from the provisional data collected by the 2010 EU-SILC survey, as well as from piecemeal information, that average income declined in a number of countries in 2009, which in itself would have tended to reduce the proportion of people at risk of poverty by lowering the threshold. At the same time, piecemeal evidence also suggests that this reduction in income was not spread evenly across households but has affected those at the lower end of the income distribution more than those at the upper end, so that the net effect on the relative number at risk of poverty is uncertain.



7. Concluding remarks

It is evident from the analysis set out here that employment developments since the onset of the recession in 2008 have had a significant effect on the distribution of income, which is only partly reflected in the scale of job losses –and the increase in unemployment – which have occurred.

In the period of growth before the recession, employment increased at a significant rate virtually throughout the EU. Much of the increase in the EU15, though not in the EU12, took the form of a growing number of women joining the labour market and finding jobs, Although many of these jobs were part-time, this added to income in households right across the income spectrum, so tending to offset in some degree any trend towards a widening of the distribution of earnings. At the same time, the relative number of people employed in higher level, and higher paid, jobs increased in most countries, though less so in the EU12, with the similar effect of offsetting the growing inequality in earnings.

Conversely, the additional jobs created during the growth years tended to be taken by women living in households where there was already someone in work, especially in the EU15, so that in many countries, there was little or no reduction in the proportion of people living in jobless households.

Since the onset of the recession and the hesitant recovery which has followed it, employment has declined virtually throughout the EU. This decline has disproportionately affected young people under the age of 25, who contributed relatively little to the growth in employment in the years before the recession but who accounted for more than half of the reduction in employment which occurred across the EU over the two years 2008-2010. The lack of new job creation coupled with the non-replacement of many of the workers retiring meant that many young people leaving education or initial vocational training skilled had no jobs to move into. The effect of this on the distribution of income, however, is difficult to assess because many of the people concerned live in the family home and, accordingly are supported to some extent by the earnings of their parents and/or have decided to remain longer in education, perhaps with government support.

For those aged 25 and over, who tend to be more dependent on earnings from employment, men and women - especially, the former – employed in skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs were hit hardest by the recession, since construction and manufacturing bore the brunt of the economic downturn. This has meant a reduction in the relative number employed around the middle of the earnings distribution, mirroring the shift which occurred over the growth years across the EU as a whole, though this was by no means a common tendency in all countries. Indeed, in the countries which experienced a construction boom in the years leading up to the recession – Ireland, Spain and the three Baltic States – job growth was particularly high for skilled manual workers employed in the industry. Such workers in these countries accordingly suffered an especially large reduction in employment as the boom was replaced by a collapse of the industry.

Whereas, however, the relative reduction in jobs in the middle of the earnings distribution during the growth years was mirrored in most countries by a growth of jobs at the upper end of the distribution, during the crisis period, there has been a relative (rather than



absolute) expansion of jobs at both the top and bottom ends of the distribution. At the same time, there has also been a shift away from full-time to part-time jobs for men as well as women and in the EU12 – where part-time working before the recession was very limited – as well as in the EU15. Moreover, this shift is evident not only for the lower paid jobs (in retailing, hotels and restaurants) but also for the higher paid ones. Most of the jobs created over the period 2008-2010, therefore, were part-time while virtually all of the jobs lost were full-time. Accordingly, the reduction in employment which occurred over this period tends to understate the effect on income.

It also tends to understate the effect on income in many countries because it leaves out of account the household circumstances of those losing their jobs and the extent to which there are other members of the household with earnings from employment to fall back on to supplement the social transfers they might receive. Those employed as skilled and semi-skilled manual workers across the EU were, therefore, more likely to have been the sole wage earner in the household than in the case of other occupational groups, and their income was, accordingly, particularly affected by the loss of employment. Partly because of this, the increase in the relative number of people living in jobless or low work intensity households was larger in many countries than implied by the reduction in employment in itself.

This increase not only widened income inequalities but is also likely to have led to a rise in the proportion of the population at risk of poverty across the EU. The reduction in the work intensity of households resulting from the decline in employment implies in itself an increase in the relative number of people at risk of poverty in the EU (i.e. with income below 60% of the national median) of some 0.5 of a percentage point, or around 2.5 million, though by much more in the three Baltics States, Ireland and Spain.

In addition, those in lower paid jobs who managed to remain in employment over the 2008-2010 period are more likely than those in higher paid jobs to have experienced a decline in the work intensity of the household in which they live – either because they have changed from working full-time to part-time or because their partner has made such a change or no longer has a job at all. This tendency is particularly evident in the countries which have suffered the biggest reductions in employment – in Ireland, Spain and the Baltic States. In each of these, those employed in higher level, and higher, paid jobs have experienced a much smaller downward shift in household work intensity, or, in other words, a much smaller loss of support from their spouses or partners who for the most part have remained in employment, than those in lower paid jobs.

The differential changes in the household circumstances of those at the top and bottom ends of the earnings distribution, therefore, have tended to reinforce the effect of labour market developments on income inequality and have added to the numbers at risk of poverty.

Annex

Figure A.1 Young people aged 16-24 living with their parents, 2009 (% total in age group)





Figure A.2 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households according to EU-SILC and LFS, 2008



**Table A.1 Proportion of those aged 25-64 at risk of poverty (income below 60% of median) by work intensity of households (on LFS definition), 2008 income year**

	<i>% total in each group</i>				
	Zero	Low	Half	Half-to-full	Full
Belgium	34.9	18.0	10.1	1.7	3.6
Bulgaria	58.6	60.3	14.2	19.3	4.1
Czech Republic	28.6	13.3	5.6	4.9	2.3
Denmark	25.3	12.5	8.7	3.5	6.1
Germany	52.9	27.8	13.2	4.1	4.3
Estonia	58.7	29.8	15.0	9.5	5.9
Ireland	38.4	15.4	7.3	3.3	3.3
Greece	30.4	44.4	20.6	21.0	8.8
Spain	39.3	33.0	16.7	13.8	7.0
France	21.0	23.6	13.6	4.0	3.9
Italy	33.9	27.4	17.7	6.3	4.9
Cyprus	41.1	24.7	14.4	5.3	4.5
Latvia	59.6	36.5	16.1	21.0	8.0
Lithuania	55.3	56.6	18.9	15.4	7.8
Luxembourg	27.1	34.7	15.4	7.4	7.0
Hungary	24.5	25.3	11.0	13.5	4.1
Malta	39.3	19.0	10.4	5.1	2.7
Netherlands	24.4	8.0	11.6	3.6	4.5
Austria	30.6	22.7	9.8	3.0	3.8
Poland	33.0	28.6	15.9	19.3	8.4
Portugal	36.1	35.3	19.9	24.0	5.6
Romania	30.4	45.9	18.3	43.6	10.8
Slovenia	34.0	12.9	9.1	5.4	3.2
Slovakia	25.7	30.1	9.1	9.9	3.9
Finland	38.8	15.5	8.6	2.1	3.0
Sweden	32.4	13.3	13.0	3.6	5.2
UK	48.8	38.5	15.1	5.8	3.3
EU12	37.1	42.6	17.3	23.1	8.0
EU12, excl. RO	34.7	33.8	13.2	14.7	5.8
EU15	41.0	32.6	17.4	5.9	5.3
EU27	40.3	34.3	17.4	6.8	6.0

*Note: See text for a definition of the household work intensity groups
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC and authors' calculations*

**Table A.2 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households, 2003 and 2007**

% Total aged 25-64

	Jobless		Low		Half		Half-to-full		Full	
	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007
BE	19.3	17.7	4.4	4.3	31.5	27.7	14.9	16.5	29.8	33.8
BG*	20.2	16.3	3.7	2.2	41.2	37.3	0.9	0.5	34.0	43.8
CZ	12.4	11.7	1.6	1.4	34.7	33.5	3.2	3.3	48.2	50.1
DE	17.2	13.7	4.0	4.3	29.3	27.4	16.3	19.3	33.2	35.3
EE	13.5	9.2	3.0	1.7	33.6	31.0	3.7	4.2	46.2	54.0
IE**	10.0	9.9	3.8	3.9	36.7	36.2	11.8	12.3	37.7	37.8
EL	11.9	11.5	3.4	3.1	49.5	46.1	1.9	2.8	33.3	36.5
ES	9.6	9.2	4.8	4.4	53.4	45.9	4.3	7.5	28.0	33.0
FR	15.4	15.6	3.7	4.0	27.0	26.1	13.1	13.2	40.9	41.1
IT*	13.1	13.2	5.8	5.4	47.3	44.4	7.4	8.3	26.5	28.7
CY	7.6	6.9	2.3	2.0	36.8	37.2	5.6	4.4	47.6	49.5
LV	13.5	9.5	4.4	2.4	41.0	38.8	4.6	2.2	36.5	47.1
LT	10.4	9.9	3.7	3.3	43.1	36.5	4.0	3.8	38.9	46.5
LU	12.3	11.6	2.2	3.4	39.8	33.2	11.8	16.7	33.9	35.0
MT	20.6	16.7	2.8	2.9	38.6	40.4	1.5	1.8	36.5	38.3
HU	11.7	13.3	3.6	3.9	64.5	61.8	4.5	6.0	15.8	15.1
NL	12.8	11.9	6.7	6.7	28.3	26.8	33.3	34.2	18.9	20.4
AT*	16.1	12.1	4.4	3.9	32.8	31.6	14.7	16.9	32.0	35.5
PL	18.3	15.2	6.2	4.9	45.6	44.5	3.0	3.4	27.0	32.1
PT	7.6	8.3	3.8	4.0	40.0	39.1	4.6	4.4	44.1	44.2
RO	14.7	13.0	5.2	5.6	38.6	41.9	3.3	2.4	38.2	37.1
SI	14.0	10.6	2.2	2.7	39.5	36.9	2.4	3.8	41.9	46.0
SK	14.4	12.8	3.4	2.7	45.2	44.8	1.1	1.0	35.9	38.7
FI	15.1	13.3	3.0	2.6	25.0	23.8	5.9	6.7	51.0	53.6
UK	14.1	13.7	4.4	4.4	24.8	24.9	19.8	18.9	37.0	38.1
EU15	14.2	13.1	4.5	4.5	35.0	32.9	13.2	14.4	33.1	35.2
EU12	16.5	13.9	4.6	4.0	41.5	41.2	2.8	2.7	34.7	38.2
EU27	14.7	13.3	4.5	4.4	36.4	34.7	10.9	11.8	33.5	35.8

Note: See Box in text for the definition of the work intensity terms and a description of how work intensity is calculated.

The figures for EU15 exclude Denmark and Sweden for which no household data are available from the LFS. The figures for 2003 have been adjusted to allow for missing data for Italy, Ireland and Austria for this year in the case of the EU15 and for Bulgaria in the case of the EU12

* 2003 data relate to 2004; ** 2003 data relate to 2006

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and authors' calculations


Table A.3 Division of those aged 25-64 by work intensity of households, 2008 and 2010

% Total aged 25-64

	Jobless		Low		Half		Half-to-full		Full	
	2008	2010	2008	2010	2008	2010	2008	2010	2008	2010
BE	17.7	18.1	4.3	4.8	26.7	25.8	16.9	17.4	34.4	33.9
BG	13.2	15.8	2.3	3.2	37.7	39.9	0.7	0.7	46.0	40.5
CZ	11.5	12.6	1.2	1.6	33.1	34.5	3.1	3.8	51.1	47.5
DE	13.3	12.6	4.1	4.4	26.0	26.6	20.1	20.3	36.5	36.2
EE	9.2	15.0	1.5	3.7	30.2	34.7	4.3	4.1	54.8	42.6
IE	10.7	16.6	4.1	7.3	35.1	33.3	12.6	11.3	37.5	31.5
EL	11.3	14.1	2.9	3.8	46.0	43.7	2.9	2.9	36.9	35.5
ES	10.1	14.2	4.5	6.5	45.5	43.4	7.3	6.8	32.5	29.1
FR	15.8	16.7	3.9	4.2	25.1	25.3	13.1	13.0	42.1	40.9
IT	13.7	15.3	5.5	6.0	43.3	42.5	8.7	8.4	28.9	27.8
CY	7.2	8.2	2.1	2.5	36.5	35.7	4.7	5.8	49.5	47.8
LV	9.1	14.6	2.2	5.0	39.5	42.0	2.9	3.7	46.3	34.6
LT	11.9	16.5	2.3	3.9	32.3	34.8	3.1	3.0	50.4	41.8
LU	12.4	11.0	2.8	3.2	33.7	31.3	17.0	16.3	34.2	38.3
MT	17.3	17.7	3.2	4.1	40.2	41.3	1.9	2.1	37.5	34.7
HU	14.2	13.5	3.6	4.6	59.6	58.8	6.3	5.7	16.3	17.4
NL	11.1	11.9	6.3	7.7	25.9	26.1	35.7	35.4	21.0	18.8
AT	11.9	12.1	4.1	5.0	30.8	29.7	17.1	18.0	36.1	35.2
PL	14.0	15.0	4.3	4.7	44.2	43.3	3.3	3.1	34.1	33.9
PT	8.1	9.6	4.0	4.2	38.6	39.9	4.5	4.1	44.9	42.2
RO	13.1	13.8	5.6	6.8	42.0	41.5	2.4	2.4	37.0	35.6
SI	10.7	12.9	2.5	2.9	35.0	34.4	3.6	5.1	48.3	44.6
SK	11.4	13.3	2.7	3.9	44.2	45.6	0.9	1.1	40.9	36.1
FI	12.4	13.9	2.6	3.0	23.5	24.3	6.7	7.0	54.7	51.8
UK	13.6	14.7	4.2	5.0	25.6	25.7	18.0	17.8	38.6	36.7
EU15	13.1	14.1	4.4	5.0	32.3	31.0	14.5	15.4	35.7	34.6
EU12	13.3	14.7	3.7	4.5	40.9	41.1	2.7	2.7	39.4	37.0
EU27	13.2	14.2	4.3	4.9	34.1	32.9	11.9	13.0	36.5	35.0

Note: See Box in text for the definition of the work intensity terms and a description of how work intensity is calculated.

The figures for EU15 and EU27 exclude Denmark and Sweden for which no household data are available from the LFS.

Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey and authors' calculations